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Background
In the past 100  years, a huge of extensions of the traditional Economic Order Quan-
tity (EOQ) model has been proposed by lots of researchers. Recently, the International 
Journal of Production Economics published a special issue “Celebrating a century of the 
economic order quantity model in honor of Ford Whitman Harris”. Among them, Andri-
olo et al. (2014) and Glock et al. (2014) respectively adopted different methodologies to 
analysis the evolution and main streams of these research emerged from Harris’ seminal 
lot size during 100 years of history and proposed a new research opportunities for future 
research, such as, sustainability issue and cash flows. Latest works include those by Bat-
tini et al. (2014), and Marchi et al. (2016), among others.
One of most important extensions is that incorporating trade credit into the EOQ. It 
assumes that supplier offers retailer/buyer a permissible delay in payments (trade credit 
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period). The account is not settled during trade credit period and there is no interest 
charge. In fact, as short-term financing tool, trade credit is widely implemented in fierce 
competitive circumstance and has important influence on inventory holding cost (Azzi 
et al. 2014).
Goyal (1985) first fully analysis the impact of fixed permissible delay in payments 
on the retailer’s ordering decision. Since then, the effect of fixed trade credit on the 
replenishment policy has been studied in extensive literatures. For instance, Aggarwal 
and Jaggi (1995) extended Goyal’s model (1985) to consider exponentially deteriorat-
ing items. Teng (2002) further established an easy analytical closed-form solution about 
Goyal’s model (1985) by considering the difference between the purchase cost and the 
retail price. Furthermore, Huang (2003) proposed a brand new inventory model under 
two levels of trade credit where the manufacturer offers trade credit to the retailer, and 
the retailer also offers his or her customer partial trade credit.
Teng et  al. (2012a, b) extended the constant demand to a linear increasing demand 
under trade credit. Wu and Zhao (2015a) recently established an EOQ model with a 
constant deterioration rate, a current inventory-dependent and linearly increasing time-
varying demand under trade credit and presented some fundamental theoretical results. 
Lots of related articles can be seen in Khouja and Mehrez (1996), Chu et  al. (1998), 
Chang and Dye (2001), Teng and Chang (2009), Jain and Aggarwal (2012), Chung (2013), 
Zhou et  al. (2013), Chen and Teng (2014), Ouyang et  al. (2014), among others. How-
ever, most of these models assumed that a trade credit period is fixed parameter and the 
retailer sets up its own strategy only from its individual perspective. Elaborating on this 
subject, Chang et al. (2008), Seifert et al. (2013), and Molamohamadi et al. (2014) con-
ducted comprehensive literature reviews of different model settings.
On the other hand, like quantity discount, price discount, etc., as a profit transfer 
means, trade credit has been deeply studied in supply chain coordination. For instance, 
Yang and Wee (2006) presented a collaborative model for deteriorating items with 
price-sensitive demand and finite replenishment rate under trade credit and proposed a 
negotiation factor to share the additional profit between the vendor and buyer. Sarmah 
et al. (2008) considered the issue of coordination with trade credit term in a single sup-
plier and multiple heterogeneous retailers at same replenishment cycle time. Wu and 
Zhao (2014a) recently established a collaborative model under trade credit for inven-
tory-dependent and time-varying demand during the finite planning horizon. Other 
related articles can be seen in Jaber and Osman (2006), Chen and Kang (2007), Huang 
et al. (2010), Chan et al. (2010), Krichen et al. (2011), Teng et al. (2012a, b), Hsu and Hsu 
(2013), Wu and Zhao (2014b), Glock and Kim (2015), and Marchi et al. (2016), among 
others. These papers assumed that trade credit is a decision variable and coordination 
mechanism, and discussed the effect of trade credit in coordinating supply chain for dif-
ferent settings.
However, how to determinate an optimal trade credit period for the supplier has been 
received limited attention for a long time. Although, Kim et  al. (1995) first proposed 
a strategy to determine the optimal trade credit period for supplier and the optimal 
pricing for the retailer in supplier-Stackelberg game. And then, Abad and Jaggi (2003) 
extended the model of Kim et  al. (1995). The two literatures did not arouse scholars’ 
attention at that time. The question can be really solved until Teng and Lou (2012) 
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proposed the demand rate is an increasing function of the trade credit period (a deci-
sion variable). Although, Jaggi et al. (2008) first assumed that trade credit period has a 
positive impact on demand and set up a polynomial function, where trade credit period 
is still given parameter. Of course, other researcher also proposed inventory model with 
demand rate is dependent on the trade credit period, such as, Ho (2011), Giri and Maiti 
(2013), the trade credit period is constant.
At present, determining optimal trade credit period is being more and more atten-
tion from researchers. There are two main research views, one is trade credit provider 
perspective, and other is game perspective. From trade credit provider perspective, for 
instance, Lou and Wang (2012) extended Teng and Lou’s model (2012) to establish an 
EOQ model to derive optimal trade credit period and lot size simultaneously. But, in 
their model, they didn’t concern the retailer’s benefit and an additional capital oppor-
tunity cost the supplier burdens for offering trade credit. Recently, Teng et  al. (2014) 
extended Lou and Wang’s model (2012) to consider learning curve phenomenon and 
the loss of capital opportunity during the delay payment period. Dye and Yang (2015) 
further extended Lou and Wang’s model (2012) to include cases with partial backorder 
and the supplier’s opportunity cost and two carbon emission constraints. Chen and Teng 
(2015) recently extended Teng and Lou’s model (2012) to consider time-varying dete-
riorating items and default risk rates under two levels of trade credit by discounted cash 
flow analysis. Other prominent and latest works include those by Wang et al. (2014), Wu 
et al. (2014), and Shah and Cárdenas-Barrón (2015), among others.
Determining optimal trade credit period from the game perspective is becoming con-
cerned. Only a few corresponding articles may be found in latest literatures. Zhou et al. 
(2012) established an uncooperative inventory model for items with stock-dependent 
demand where the retailer has limited displayed-shelf space, and optimized the trade 
credit period in a two-echelon supply chain. Zhou and Zhou (2013) investigated two 
trade credit scenarios, i.e., unconditional and conditional trade credit, and discussed 
how the supplier sets up trade credit period to minimize his or her cost under supplier-
Stackelberg game in a two-echelon supply chain. Based on the models of Zhou and 
Zhou (2013) and Teng et al. (2014), Wu and Zhao (2015b) established an uncooperative 
replenishment model with time-varying demand and time-varying price and learning 
curve phenomenon under finite planning horizon and supplier-Stackelberg game. How-
ever, these cited references do not consider the effect of trade credit period on market 
demand and default risk.
Additionally, based on the achievements of Teng and Lou (2012) and Lou and Wang 
(2012), Chern et al. (2013) recently established a vendor–buyer Stackelberg equilibrium 
model with compounded interest rate and relaxing lot-for lot replenishment policy, and 
derived the vendor’s optimal ordering policy and trade credit period. Chern et al. (2014) 
extended the model of Chern et  al. (2013) to establish a vendor–buyer supply chain 
model in Nash game. But the two references ignored the results of decentralized deci-
sion and centralized decision without trade credit, and didn’t compare with the results of 
Nash equilibrium and supplier-Stackelberg models with trade credit in detail.
In this paper, we discuss about two retailer–supplier uncooperative replenish-
ment models with trade credit where the demand and default risk are liked to trade 
credit period, i.e., a Nash equilibrium model and a supplier-Stackelberg model. We 
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comprehensively compare between the results of decentralized decision and central-
ized decision without trade credit, and Nash game and supplier-Stackelberg models with 
trade credit. We distinguish the impact of trade credit period on the demand and default 
risk to observe two parties’ profit and behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In “Assumptions and notation” 
section, assumptions and notation are presented. In “Mathematical formulation of the 
model without trade credit” section, we present the decentralized and centralized inven-
tory models without trade credit. In “Mathematical formulation of the models with 
trade credit” section, we derive uncooperative supply chain inventory models with trade 
credit in Nash game and supplier-Stackelberg game, respectively. In “Numerical exam-
ples and analysis” section, we present a numerical example and sensitivity analysis, and 
propose important conclusions on managerial phenomena. The last section summarizes 
the paper’s findings and suggests areas for future research.
Assumptions and notation
The following assumptions and notation are used throughout the paper. Some assump-
tions and notation will be presented later when they are needed.
Assumptions
(i)  Permissible delay in payments or trade credit attracts new buyers who consider it 
to be a type of price reduction. According to the previous literatures, such as that 
by Teng and Lou (2012), Lou and Wang (2012), Chern et al. (2013), and Teng et al. 
(2014), among other authors, demand rate is assumed to be a polynomial or expo-
nential function of the trade credit period. For convenience, the demand rate D(t) 
may be given by
where, K > 0, a≥0.
The basis of the simple demand expression depends on two assumptions. One is the 
impact of trade credit on the demand, the other is the uncertainty of environment influ-
ence on the expectation value of the demand is zero (Jeuland and Shugan, 1983).
(ii)  The longer the trade credit period is to the retailer, the higher the default risk is to 
the supplier. The default risk function with respect to trade credit period is given by
where, b≥0.
(iii) Shortages are not permitted and lead time is zero.
(v) The replenishment is instantaneous and the production rate is finite. Furthermore, 
the demand for the product does not exceed the production rate in model.
(vi) The supplier follows a lot-for-lot replenishment policy.
(vii) To simplify the problem and obtain main conclusions, we further assume that the 
retailer’s capital opportunity cost equal to its opportunity gain.
Notation
For convenience, subscript i represents different member, i = s represents the supplier; 
i = r represents the retailer; i = sc represents the whole supply chain.
(1)D(M) = KeaM ,
(2)F(M) = 1− e−bM ,
Page 5 of 22Wu and Zhao  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:1728 
A  the production rate per year for the supplier.
b  the default risk coefficient.






a, where, K  the 
basic demand rate, a the increasing demand coefficient.
Si  the setup cost, $/order, i = s, r.
C  the production cost per unit, $/unit.
W  the wholesale price per unit, $/unit.
P  the retail price per unit, $/unit, with P >W > C.
hi  the inventory holding cost, $/unit/year, i = s, r.
Ii  the interest charged per dollar per year, $/year, i = s, r.

j
i  total annual profit. i = s, r, sc, j = 0, 1, 2, 3. j = 0 decentralized decision; 
j = 1 centralized decision; j = 2 the Nash game; j = 3 the supplier-Stackel-
berg game.
Mj  the length of the trade credit period offered by the supplier in years, decision 
variable, j = 2, 3.
Qj  the order quantity, decision variable, j = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Mathematical formulation of the model without trade credit
In this section, we first propose two inventory models without trade credit, i.e., decen-
tralized decision and centralized decision. The corresponding results of the two scenar-
ios will be used as comparison benchmarks when the supplier permits delay in payments 
to the retailer for supply chain coordination.
Firstly, in the decentralized decision, there is no coordination and no trade credit 
between the supplier and the retailer. Therefore, the demand rate is constant K . The 
retailer adopts the classic EOQ solution to optimize its total profit or total cost. The 
optimal economic order quantity (EOQ) of the retailer is given by
and the optimal annual profit of the retailer is
When the retailer orders Q0∗, the supplier will produce lot size Q0∗ and instantane-
ously replenishes the retailer according to the lot-for-lot policy. Therefore, the supplier’s 
total annual profit is expressed as
Consequently, the total annual profit of the supply chain is given by
Secondly, in the centralized decision, the supplier and the retailer are willing to col-
laborate and form a vertical alliance or virtual integrated firm. They will jointly decide 
the replenishment schedule. For no trade credit, the demand rate is still constant, K . In 




(4)�0r = (P −W )K −
√
2KSrhr .












Page 6 of 22Wu and Zhao  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:1728 
Therefore, the optimal joint order quantity of the supply chain is given by
The optimal annual profit of the supply chain responding to lot size Q1∗ will be
Mathematical formulation of the models with trade credit
According to the assumptions (i) and (ii), the supplier’s expected net revenue with 
default risk is WD(M)(1− F(M)) =WKe(a−b)M. Additionally, he or she will burden an 
additional capital opportunity cost, i.e., CKeaMIsM, for offering trade credit period M to 
the retailer. Meanwhile, for the retailer, he or she can save an additional capital opportu-
nity cost WKeaMIrM. Therefore, the retailer’s and the supplier’s total annual profits can 
be expressed as
respectively.
Two parties’ decision making in Nash game
In this subsection, we assume that the supplier and the retailer have the same bargaining 
power, i.e., neither side has the monopoly strength. Under this background, the optimal 
equilibrium solution is Nash equilibrium.
From the view of Nash game, the first derivative condition of �2r (Q) with respect to 
Q and the first derivative condition of �2s (M) with respect to M should be established 
simultaneously. Therefore, the first derivative d�2r (Q)
/
dQ and the first derivative 
d�2s (M)/dM will be given by
First, by the first derivative condition d�2r (Q)/dQ = 0, the optimal ordering lot size in 
Nash game is given by
Next, substituting Q2∗ =
√
2SrKeaM/hr  into Eq.  (13), the d�2s (M)/dM may be 
reduced to
(7)�1sc(Q) = (P − C)K − K (Sr + Ss)/Q − Qhr/2− KQhs/2A.
(8)Q1∗ =
√
2AK (Sr + Ss)/(Ahr + Khs).
(9)�1sc = (P − C)K −
√
2K (Sr + Ss)(Ahr + Khs)/A.
(10)�2r (Q) = �
3
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It includes a single decision variable M.
Theorem 1 The supplier’s optimal trade credit period is zero (i.e., M2∗ = 0) if (i) a ≤ b, 
or (ii) (a− b)W ≤ aC, or (iii) (a− b)W ≤ aC + CIs.




< 0. Consequently, the optimal trade credit 
period is zero, i.e., M2∗ = 0. Similarly, if (a− b)W ≤ aC, or (a− b)W ≤ aC + CIs, we 




< 0, and M2∗ = 0. This completes the proof.
Consequently, the retailer’s and the supplier’s total annual profits are given by
That is to say, the two parties don’t achieve any coordination or improvement in 
Theorem 1.
Next, we discuss the another condition, i.e., (a− b)W > aC + CIs. By the first deriva-
tive condition d�2s (M)
/
dM = 0, we can obtain
From Eq. (18), the optimal trade credit period function is given by
Note that the left and right sides of Eq. (19) are functions of M. Due to the complex-
ity of the problem, it seems difficult to derive a closed-form expression. Additionally, in 
Eq. (19), we obviously observe that the left side increases and the right side decreases as 
M increases. There is only one intersection point when the two sides of Eq. (19) inter-
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− CIs > 0.
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> 0, (i) if 
M2∗¯ < Mmax, the final optimal trade credit period is M2∗ = M2∗¯; (ii) if M2∗¯ ≥ Mmax, the 
final optimal trade credit period is M2∗ = Mmax.










> 0, we can 
obtain that
Additionally, applying the second derivative of �2s (M) with respect to M, we have





− 2aCIs ≤ 0 





− 2aCIs > 0.





− 2aCIs ≤ 0.









< 0. Therefore, �2s (M) is a strictly concave function in [0,∞). Therefore, 
combining with Eq. (20) and Eq. (21), we know that there exists a unique positive opti-




= 0, denoted as M2∗¯.





− 2aCIs > 0
In this case, we know that the value of d
2�2s (M)
dM2
 moves from positive to negative as M 
increases, that is to say, �2s (M) is a convex-concave function of M. Therefore, combining 
with Eq. (20) and Eq. (21), we know that �2s (M) is a unimodal function in [0,∞). There 




= 0, denoted as M2∗¯.










> 0, the solution of 
Eq.  (19) is a unique optimal positive solution M2∗¯ for �2s (M). Then, we consider the 
upper bound of M, i.e., Mmax. If M2∗¯ < Mmax, the final optimal trade credit period is 
M2∗ = M2∗¯. If M2∗¯ ≥ Mmax, the final optimal trade credit period is M2∗ = Mmax. This 
completes the proof.
From Eq. (19) and Theorem 2, we obtain the following results.
Corollary 1 (i) A higher value of a, W , A and a lower value of b, C, Ss, hs, Is cause a 
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(ii) The change of P and Ir, i.e., the retailer’s profit parameters, do not affect the supplier 
as to whether to offer trade credit to the retailer.










> 0 , 
Eq. (19) and Theorem 2.
A simple economic interpretation is as follows. A higher value of a (i.e., increasing 
demand coefficient) leads to a higher demand, and higher values of W  and A lead to 
higher revenue. Hence, the supplier is willing to offer a longer trade credit period. On 
the other hand, lower values of b (i.e., default risk coefficient) and C lead to a higher 
expected revenue for supplier, and lower values of Ss, hs, and Is lead to a lower ordering 
and inventory cost. Hence, the supplier willing to offer a longer trade credit period to the 
retailer.
Furthermore, according to Theorem 2, Theorem 1 can be modified to Theorem 3.
Theorem  3 The supplier’s optimal trade credit period is zero (i.e., M2∗ = 0 ) 
if (i) a ≤ b, or (ii) (a− b)W ≤ aC, or (iii) (a− b)W ≤ aC + CIs, or (iv) 











Corollary 2 The supplier’s optimal trade credit period is zero (i.e., M2∗ = 0) if 




Proof We use the theorem that the arithmetic mean is not always less than the geomet-
ric mean. It is omitted.
In a word, the retailer’s and the supplier’s final total annual profits in Nash game are 
given by
respectively.
Note that �2r (M2∗) is an increasing function of M2∗ only if 0r ≥ 0, which is a rea-
sonable assumption. That is to say, as long as the trade credit period is offered by the 
supplier, �2r (M2∗) is greater than 0r , i.e., �2r (M2∗) ≥ �0r . Additionally, it is obvious that 
�2s (M
2∗) ≥ �0s . Proof is omitted.
Two parties’ decision making in a supplier‑Stackelberg game
In this subsection, we suppose that the supplier is the dominating company over the 
retailer. For example, a supplier, such as Siwin Foods, (a famous food manufacturer in 
China) has a dominate power over its downstream small store. Consequently, the domi-
nating company (e.g., Siwin Foods) acts as a leader, its downstream small store acts as 
a follower, which call a supplier-Stackelberg game. In a supplier-Stackelberg game, the 
(23)�2r (M
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supplier offers a trade credit period M, and then the retailer maximizes his or her own 
profit to find optimal ordering lot size, next, the supplier observes the retailer’s optimal 
solution as a function of M, finally, he or she find the optimal M.
(i) The retailer’s optimal response
Firstly, we should know how the retailer responds to any trade credit period M offered 
by the supplier. By the first derivative necessary condition d�3r (Q)
/
dQ = 0, the optimal 
ordering lot size in a supplier-Stackelberg game is given by
which is a function of M.
(ii) The supplier’s optimization
After observing the optimal response of the retailer (given by Eq.  (25)), the supplier 
selects optimal M so that his or her total annual profit is maximized.




hr  into Eq. (11), the �3s (M) can be modified 
to a new function of M will be given by
In order to maximize �3s (M) in Eq. (26), we obtain
Theorem 4 The supplier’s optimal trade credit period is zero (i.e., M3∗ = 0) if (i) a ≤ b, 
or (ii) (a− b)W ≤ aC, or (iii) (a− b)W ≤ aC + CIs.
Proof We omit the proof of Theorem 4 since it mimics that of Theorem 1.
Consequently, the retailer’s and the supplier’s total annual profits are given by
That is to say, the two parties don’t achieve any coordination or improvement in 
Theorem 4.
Next, we discuss the another condition, i.e., (a− b)W > aC + CIs. By the first deriva-
tive condition d�3s (M)
/

























































A = �0s .
(30)












− CIs − aCIsM = 0.
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From Eq. (30), the optimal trade credit period function is given by










> 0, (i) if 
M3∗¯ < Mmax, the final optimal trade credit period is M3∗ = M3∗¯; (ii) if M3∗¯ ≥ Mmax, the 
final optimal trade credit period is M3∗ = Mmax.
Proof We omit the proof of Theorem 5 since it mimics that of Theorem 2.
From Eq. (31) and Theorem 5, we can obtain the following results.
Corollary 3 (i) A higher value of a, W , A and a lower value of b, C, Ss, hs, Is cause a 











(ii) The change of P and Ir, i.e., the retailer’s profit parameters, do not affect the supplier 
as to whether to offer trade credit to the retailer.
Proof It is omitted.
Likewise, according to Theorem 5, Theorem 4 can be modified to Theorem 6.
Theorem  6 The supplier’s optimal trade credit period is zero (i.e., �3r (M3∗) ≥ �0r ) 
if (i) a ≤ b, or (ii) (a− b)W ≤ aC, or (iii) (a− b)W ≤ aC + CIs, or (iv) 













Corollary 4 The supplier’s optimal trade credit period is zero (i.e., M3∗ = 0) if 




Proof It is omitted.
Consequently, the retailer’s and the supplier’s final total annual profits in a supplier-





































− CIs > 0.
(32)�3r (M
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Likewize, �3r (M3∗) is an increasing function of M3∗ only if 0r ≥ 0. Therefore, as long 
as the trade credit period is offered by the supplier, �3r (M3∗) is greater than 0r , i.e., 
�3r (M
3∗) ≥ �0r . Additionally, it is obvious that �3s (M3∗) ≥ �0s . Proof is omitted.
Numerical examples and analysis
According to the analysis and arguments in Sect. 4, when the final optimal trade credit 
period is zero, the retailer’s and the supplier’s total annual profits will not be improved. 
Therefore, the following numerical example is proposed to illustrate the improvement 
process for the two games.
Example Given A = 10000 units/year, K = 3600 units/year, a = 1, b = 0.3, P = $35/
unit, W = $23/unit, C = $12/unit, Sr  =  $200/order, hr = $5/unit/year, Ir = 0.12/year, 
Ss = $300/setup, hs = $4.5/unit/year, Is = 0.1/year, respectively.
By applying the corresponding expressions, the results are obtained as follow.
In the decentralized decision, the economic order quantity Q0∗ = 537 units, 
0r = $40517/year, 0s = $37153/year, the annual profit of the supply chain 0sc = $77670
/year.
In the centralized decision, the optimal joint order quantity Q1∗ = 737 units. The opti-
mal annual profit of the supply chain 1sc = $77918/year.










= 2.22 > 0. 
Consequently, M2∗¯ = 0.3989 years = 145 days, and Mmax = 1.0217 years. According to 
Theorem 2, for Mmax > M2∗¯, the final optimal trade credit period M2∗ = M2∗¯ = 0.3989 
years. Consequently, Q2∗ = 655 units; D2 = 5365 units/year, an increase of 49.03  % 
(5365−3600
3600
∗ 100% = 49.03%); �2r (M2∗) = $67010/year, an increase of 65.39  % 
(67010−40517
40517
∗ 100% = 65.39%) from the decentralized decision; �2s (M2∗) = $39279/
year, an increase of 5.72  % (39279−37153
37153
∗ 100% = 5.72%) from the decentralized deci-
sion; �2sc(M2∗) = $106289/year, an increase of 36.41 % (106289−7791877918 ∗ 100% = 36.41% ) 
from the centralized decision. However, we notice that the default risk is F2 = 11.3%.










= 2.44 > 0. Consequently, M3∗¯ = 0.4273 years = 156 days. According to 
Theorem 5, for Mmax > M3∗¯, the final optimal trade credit period M3∗ = M3∗¯ = 0.4273 
years. Consequently, Q3∗ = 664 units/order; D3 = 5519 units/year, an increase of 
53.31  %; �3r (M3∗) = $69420/year, an increase of 71.34  % from the decentralized deci-
sion; �3s (M3∗) = $39291/year, an increase of 5.75  % from the decentralized decision; 
�3sc(M
3∗) = $108711/year, an increase of 39.97 % from the centralized decision. How-
ever, default risk is F3 = 12%.
For gain more management insights, we present the sensitivity analysis to study the 
effects of changes in the values of parameters on the optimal values. The basic param-
eter values are the same as those in the Example. The computational results are given 
in Table 1. In addition, in order to better understanding, for a, W, b and C, the partial 
results of the sensitivity analysis have been graphed in Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4 based on the 
data in Table 1. The rest of the results in Table 1 are not represented graphically, because 
the different is very small between the corresponding results of Nash game and supplier-
Stackelberg game under the same conditions.
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Fig. 1 Influence of the increasing demand coefficient a on the optimal values
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Fig. 2 Influence of the wholesale price W on the optimal values
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Fig. 3 Influence of the default risk coefficient b on the optimal values
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Fig. 4 Influence of the production cost C on the optimal values
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The sensitivity analysis reveals the following.
(i) M2∗, F2, D2, 2r, 2s , M3∗, F3, D3, 3r, 3s  increase as a, A and W  increase, and 
decrease as b, C, Ss, hs and Is increase. This coincides with the Corollary 1 and Corol-
lary3, and the purpose of two games. Note that Mj∗ = 0 or Mj∗ = Mmax( j = 2, 3), the 
conclusion is invalid.
(ii) M2∗, F2, D2, 2r, 2s , M3∗, F3, D3, 3r, 3s  are high sensitive to a, W , b and C, moder-
ate sensitive to Ss and Is, low sensitive or insensitive to A and hs. On the one hand, the 
result shows that the change of trade credit period is greatly influenced by increasing 
demand coefficient a, default risk coefficient b, wholesale price W , and production cost 
C. Hence, the two parties should make joint promotional effort to improve the value of 
a, and to reduce the value of b, such that lead to higher the demand and higher the two 
parties revenue. Meanwhile, the supplier should strive to reduce the production costs C 
through a variety of efficient measures, or raise the wholesale price W . Both of strate-
gies can incentive the supplier to willing to offer a longer trade credit period to raise 
the profit of the retailer and the supplier. On the other hand, the result also imply that 
some errors in estimating A and hs may result in little deviation from the optimal results. 
Hence, in practice, the supplier does not have too high surplus production capacity, and 
does not need to accurately estimate on the inventory holding cost hs.
(iii) For the same conditions, the profits of the retailer, the supplier, and supply chain 
in a supplier-Stackelberg game are better than the results in Nash game, i.e., �3r > �2r , 
�3s > �
2
s , and �3sc > �2sc in the sensitivity analysis. This is because the optimal trade 
credit period M3∗ is greater than M2∗, such that the market demand from supplier-
Stackelberg game is greater than from Nash game, i.e., D3 > D2. However, we find that 
the supplier will burden higher default risk in a supplier-Stackelberg game, i.e., F3 > F2. 
Likewise, if Mj∗ = 0 or Mj∗ = Mmax( j = 2, 3), the conclusion is invalid.






�0s  when M3∗ > 0. There are 
two major reasons can explain the phenomenon. First, the supplier burdens an addi-
tional capital opportunity cost, i.e., CKeaMIsM. Second, the supplier burdens the default 
risk of trade credit from the retailer reduces his or her expected net revenue. Moreover, 




0s  and 3sc
/
0sc also 





0s  and 3sc
/
0sc is highly sensitive to a, W , b and C, moderately sensitive to 
Is, and has a low sensitive or insensitive to Ss, A and hs.
(v) In most situations, �3sc > �1sc, �2sc > �1sc, i.e., the total profits of supply chain under 
the two games are better than the results under centralized decision, only if the optimal 
trade credit period should not be too short. That is to say, the supply chain’s total profits 
with longer trade credit period under the two games are both greater than the profit of 
centralized decision. It indicates that trade credit can be used as coordination parameter.
Conclusions
How to determinate an optimal trade credit period? This question is gaining more and 
more attention from researchers. In this paper, we discuss about two retailer–supplier 
uncooperative replenishment models with default risk under trade credit policy, i.e., a 
Nash equilibrium model and a supplier-Stackelberg model.
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Generally, the main trait of this paper compared to most existing uncooperative inven-
tory model is that the developed model includes the following aspects: (i) Nash equilib-
rium game and supplier-Stackelberg game; (ii) the results of decentralized decision and 
centralized decision without trade credit as comparison benchmarks; (iii) the retailer’s 
capital opportunity cost equal to its opportunity gain; (iv) trade credit period is a deci-
sion variable; (v) the demand and default risk both are exponential functions of trade 
credit period; (vi) lot-for-lot policy; and (vii) the production rate is finite but the replen-
ishment is instantaneous. The major contribution of the paper is that we fully compare 
between the results of decentralized and centralized decision without trade credit, Nash 
equilibrium and a supplier-Stackelberg model with trade credit in detail, and obtain 
some interesting managerial insights and practical implications.
In this paper, we first derive the existence and uniqueness conditions of the optimal 
solutions for the retailer and the supplier under non-collaborative replenishment poli-
cies, i.e., Nash equilibrium game and supplier-Stackelberg game. Moreover, we develop 
a set of theorems and corollaries to determine the optimal solution and obtain some 
managerial insights. For instance, a higher value of a, W , A and a lower value of b, C, Ss , 
hs, Is cause a higher value of M2∗¯ and M3∗¯. Finally, we provide an example and sensitiv-
ity analysis to illustrate the proposed strategy. Sensitivity analysis reveals that the total 
profits of supply chain under the two games are better than the results under centralized 
decision when the optimal trade credit period isn’t too short, also suggests that the size 
of Mj∗, Fj, Dj, jr, and js ( j = 2, 3) have a strong relationship with a, W , b and C. In addi-
tion, we present other main managerial insights.
The previous results have some practical implications. On the one hand, a supplier 
may offer a retailer trade credit to expand the demand under certain conditions, espe-
cially for the growth phase or launch phase of a product life cycle, even to avoid last-
ing price competition from competitors. We usually observe that sales volume increases 
with trade credit period, but production cost decreases with time during the two stages 
of product life cycle. On the other hand, trade credit is an important financing tool for 
retailers, especially, the small and micro or starting-up retailer having lack of capital. 
However, for trade credit of default risk from retailers, the supplier should carefully 
select good retailers. Moreover, the retailer should set up a fine credit record in the mar-
kets, or a long-term relationship with the supplier.
For further research, we may extend the model to allow for other demand functions, 
such as quadratic trade credit period demand, varying demand both with trade credit 
period and time, etc. In addition, we may further consider deteriorating items, short-
ages, environmental impact, warehouse capacity constraint and single supplier/multi-
retailer non-coordination and others. Therefore, the effects of all of these additional 
scenarios may be incorporated in future research.
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